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1.  Introduction 
The relationship between “globalization” and “inequality” or “poverty” has received 
considerable attention in recent years.  The number of literature reviews alone is so large by now, 
that it seems that a review of literature reviews would be appropriate.  Some common themes 
that emerge from this literature are: (a) globalization is a catch-all term that is used to describe 
phenomena as diverse as trade liberalization, outsourcing, increased immigration flows, removal 
of capital controls, cultural globalization, and generally faster transmission of international 
shocks and trends; (b) operational definitions of both “inequality” and “poverty” are associated 
with substantial conceptual and measurement problems; and (c) the evidence on the relationship 
between globalization and income inequality/poverty is mixed and related empirical findings are 
subject to varying interpretations. 
Given this state of affairs, we would like to start this piece by clarifying how its focus 
will differ from previous surveys.  Our primary goal is to cover those aspects of the relationship 
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  1between globalization and income inequality/poverty that we have more hope of pinning down 
empirically. Accordingly, we concentrate on recent trade liberalization episodes in developing 
countries (especially Latin America) that consisted primarily of drastic reductions in tariff 
barriers. As we argue below, such tariff reductions provide fairly accurate measures of the 
magnitude of trade liberalization in these countries. Moreover, for the countries under 
consideration, tariff reductions constitute a “big part” of the globalization process. Second, we 
focus mostly on the short- and medium-run effects of these episodes.  These effects are easier to 
relate to trade policy changes compared to long-run, general equilibrium effects that spread over 
several years.  From a policy perspective, concern about the negative short-run effects of trade 
liberalization often stands in the way of broad acceptance of free trade among the public and 
policy makers. Third, for identification reasons, we focus on the static link between trade policy 
and income distribution that operates through short- to medium-run changes in relative prices 
and wages, rather than the dynamic, indirect link from trade, to growth, to income inequality and 
poverty. This focus does not by any means reflect our belief that growth is not an important 
channel through which increased openness affects the income distribution. However, the 
literature on the relationship between trade and growth is already vast (see Winters et al (2004) 
for a recent review), and has failed to reach a consensus on the effect of trade on growth. Finally, 
as a matter of methodology, our survey focuses primarily on case studies of particular countries 
that have analyzed micro data from household or plant level surveys. 
  The remainder of this article is structured as follows.  In section 2 we start by providing 
an overview of the relevant definitions and the conceptual issues associated with the 
measurement of trade liberalization, inequality, and poverty. In the same section we also review 
some of the commonly accepted facts regarding trends in inequality in developing countries.  In 
section 3 we identify the main channels through which trade liberalization is presumed to have 
affected inequality in developing countries, and review the evidence on each of them. Section 4 
focuses on poverty, and section 5 concludes. 
 
2.  Trade Liberalization, Inequality, and Poverty: Definitions, Measurement Problems, 
and Some Common Ground  
 
  2(a) Trade Liberalization: Even if one confines the analysis to one particular aspect of 
globalization, trade liberalization, the measurement of trade liberalization is not without its 
problems.  Trade protection has increasingly taken the form of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) that are 
inherently hard to measure.  This use of NTBs is particularly pronounced in developed countries 
and presents a serious obstacle to any effort to measure the alleged increase in openness in the 
last three decades. The traditional approach to circumventing this challenge is to use imports, 
exports, or the sum of the two as proxies of a country’s openness, and interpret their increase 
over time as the consequence of the fall of trade and/or transportation barriers. The obvious 
shortcoming with this method is that both imports and exports are determined simultaneously 
with the other variables that are the focus of the empirical analysis (e.g., wages, prices, etc.) so 
that interpretation of the results is subject to potentially serious simultaneity bias. 
Against this background, trade liberalizations in many developing countries in the late 
1980’s and early 1990’s represent a major advantage from a measurement point of view.  
Because many of these countries were either not GATT/WTO members (e.g., Mexico), or had 
not participated in the tariff-reducing GATT/WTO rounds prior to the reforms because of the 
exemption in article XVIII of GATT (e.g., Brazil, Colombia), they used tariffs as one of the 
primary policy tools.  Tariffs are both easier to measure than NTBs and comparable across time. 
More importantly, although all countries also used NTBs, NTB coverage ratios (and their 
changes over time) are highly correlated with tariffs (and their changes).  Hence, while tariff 
coefficients may overstate the pure tariff effect in regressions employing tariff changes as the 
right hand side variable, the coefficients nevertheless capture the combined effect of trade policy 
changes in each sector. 
The use of tariffs provides two additional advantages.  First, tariff changes vary 
substantially across industries during trade reform.  Figure 1 plots sectoral tariff rates in 1998 
against tariff rates in 1984 for Colombia, a country that experienced a drastic reduction in tariff 
rates between 1984 and 1994. It is apparent from this figure that trade liberalization did not 
simply reduce tariff rates, it also changed the structure of protection across industries. These 
differential tariff reductions across industries can be exploited to identify the effects of trade 
reform.  Similar patterns of changing structure of protection are reported for Mexico for the 
1984-1990 period (Hanson and Harrison (1999)), and Brazil for the 1987-1998 (Pavcnik, Blom, 
Goldberg, and Schady (2004)).  While the unilateral trade liberalization “experiments” in these 
  3countries are less “clean” compared to Colombia, in the sense that they are accompanied by other 
substantial structural changes (deregulation, a substantial increase in FDI in Mexico, the effects 
of Mercosur in Brazil)
1, the differential effects of tariff changes across industries enable one to 
separate the effects of trade liberalization from the effects of concurrent policy changes. 
A second advantage is that the usual concern about the endogeneity of trade protection is less 
pronounced in countries that liberalized in response to becoming the GATT/WTO members (or 
in complying with the GATT/WTO negotiated rates).  This reflects the government’s objective 
to reduce tariffs across industries to more uniform rates negotiated with the WTO.  Policymakers 
accordingly cater less to special lobby interests, so that tariff declines in each industry are 
proportional to the industry’s pre-reform tariff levels (see, for example, Goldberg and Pavcnik 
(2004) for Colombia, and Pavcnik, Blom, Goldberg, and Schady (2004) for Brazil), alleviating 
concerns about endogeneity at least in the economic sense. This is evident in Figure 2 that plots 
the Colombian tariff declines between 1984 and 1998 for each sector against the pre-reform tariff 
levels in 1983. The relationship is strikingly linear with the most protected sectors in 1983 (e.g., 
textiles) experiencing the largest tariff declines. Of course, concern about the endogeneity of 
tariffs in the econometric sense still remains – that is, tariff changes could be correlated with 
unobserved sector-specific factors that also affected the dependent variables in the relevant 
regressions. However, the nature of the trade reforms suggests appropriate instruments.  Because 
the total tariff changes in each sector are proportional to the pre-reform tariff levels, and the pace 
of the reforms (i.e. the year-to-year tariff change in each sector) was influenced by 
macroeconomic variables such as exchange rates, or the world prices of key agricultural 
commodities (e.g., the world price of coffee in Colombia), pre-reform tariff levels and their 
interactions with the world price of coffee, or exchange rates provide natural instruments for 
observed tariff changes.  
  While the measurement of trade liberalization through tariff changes and the availability 
of fairly powerful instruments due to the nature of trade reforms in Latin American countries 
represent improvements over previous attempts to pin down the effects of trade liberalization, it 
should also be recognized that the focus on tariff changes is informative only to the extent that 
tariff declines capture the essence of globalization in the corresponding countries. This is 
(arguably) the case in many Latin American countries were the tariff changes are significant, 
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  4especially when one takes into account that they go hand in hand with substantial reductions in 
NTBs in the same sectors.  In the textile and apparel sector in Colombia for example, tariff rates 
decline from 91% in 1984 to 18% in 1994, while the coverage ratio declines from 88 to less than 
1%.  Given the magnitude of this policy change one would expect to see some response to trade 
reform in this sector and the Colombian economy in general.  More recently, and in different 
developing countries, the extent to which tariff changes can capture the extent of globalization is 
rather limited. Tariffs are, for example, rather irrelevant in post-NAFTA Mexico, where capital 
flows, FDI, and immigration play a substantially more important role in the globalization 
process.  
 
(b) Inequality:  Measurement of inequality poses several challenges.  As pointed out by 
Ravallion (2003) the definition of inequality is itself controversial. Most of the recent work on 
developing economies has focused on the relative version of inequality and found that trade 
reforms coincide chronologically with an increase in relative inequality
2; this implies an even 
larger increase in absolute inequality.
3 
At the same time, many of the household surveys used to compute measures of inequality 
have come under scrutiny because of the suspected increase in the non-response rates of the 
richer households and because of inconsistencies in their design (see Ravallion (2003) and 
Deaton (2003) for a detailed discussion).  With respect to the measurement of inequality in 
particular, what is of most concern is the counterintuitive result in Mistiaen and Ravallion (2003) 
and Deaton (2003) that when non-response rates are increasing with income, it is possible that 
the estimated variance of the truncated income distribution exceeds the variance of the true 
distribution (while the mean is lower), so that the usual measures of inequality based on the 
second moments of the observed income distribution can be completely uninformative about the 
true change in income inequality.  Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that this drives the recent 
findings on increased inequality in many developing countries.  One needs to assume very 
particular income distributions for the estimated variance to increase when the true variance 
decreases or remains constant.  Moreover, most empirical work on inequality has used surveys 
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time, often 3-5 years. While non-response among high-income households is clearly an issue, 
especially in surveys from Latin America (see Szekely and Hilgert (1999)), for the results on 
inequality to be misleading it would have to be the case that not only high income households do 
not respond, but also that the non-response rate increased dramatically within a short period of 3-
5 years.  This seems unlikely in practice. 
What is perhaps more disconcerting is the fact that the design of the surveys from 
developing countries often changes from year to year, making comparisons across years 
difficult.
4  Despite these difficulties, the widely documented increase in inequality for several 
countries is likely not just an artifact of faulty survey design and inconsistencies across years.  
The finding of increased inequality is based typically on comparisons of the wages between 
skilled and unskilled workers rather than on the second moments of the income distribution
5.  
While one can certainly think of cases where changes in the survey design would give the 
appearance of an increase in the skill premium, it seems unlikely that such cases account for the 
documented increase in the skill premium for several countries.  In addition, the observed 
increases in skill premium over a short period of time are relatively large in magnitude, which 
casts doubt that the increases are driven by survey design and non-reporting issues alone.  In 
Mexico, for example, Cragg and Epelbaum (1996) document a skill premium increase of about 
68% between 1987 and 1993.  For other countries, such as Colombia or Brazil, the increase is 
less pronounced, but nevertheless significant; for Colombia, in particular, Attanasio, Goldberg 
and Pavcnik (2004) report a 20% increase between 1990 and 1998.  Hence, while the exact 
numbers reported in existing studies of inequality may not be completely accurate, the widely 
documented trends in wage inequality are unlikely simply a figment of data problems.  That said, 
we need to emphasize that these studies inform us only about wage inequality, and not the 
broader concept of income inequality – not to mention consumption inequality. 
Given the magnitude of the skill premium increase, a large number of studies have 
focused on potential explanations.  Despite their differences, all these explanations agree that the 
increase in the skill premium is driven by increased demand for skilled workers. The relevant 
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  6arguments can be found in Robbins (1996) and Sanchez-Paramo and Schady (2003), and are 
similar to the ones used in the context of the developed world.  These arguments are reinforced 
by the fact that Latin American countries did not experience the same increase in the supply of 
educated workers as the U.S. or East-Asian economies (Attanasio and Szekely (2000), Sanchez-
Paramo and Schady (2003)).   
The next section reviews the main explanations for why demand for skilled workers may 
have increased in developing countries, discussing in each case the connection to trade 
liberalization. The most prominent explanations include: (a) increase in the returns to particular 
occupations that are associated with a higher educational level; (b) general equilibrium effects 
consistent with the Heckscher-Ohlin model of international trade; (c) shift of skill-intensive 
intermediate goods production from developed to developing countries; a more general version 
of the above hypothesis would include the increase of FDI flows towards developing countries 
emphasizing the complementarity between capital and skilled-labor; (d) skill-biased 
technological change;  and (e) compositional changes in the products produced by developing 
countries within industries, with the mix shifting towards more skilled-labor intensive products. 
While most work has focused on potential explanations for the increasing inequality 
between skilled and unskilled workers, the skill premium alone cannot fully explain the increase 
in inequality in developing countries.  In Colombia, for example, Attanasio, Goldberg, and 
Pavcnik (2004) compute separate measures of inequality for workers in 3 education groups.  
They demonstrate that inequality has increased within each of the three groups, with the most 
pronounced increase for the university-educated group.  Moreover, earnings regressions relating 
wages to various demographics and job characteristics show that the increase in the returns to 
education can explain only a small fraction of the variance of log wages.  This suggests that 
factors other than skill premium contributed to wage inequality.  In the remainder of section 3 we 
focus on two such factors. The first one is a trade-policy-induced-change in industry wage 
premiums that have disproportionately affected workers at the left tail of the wage distribution.  
The second one is the alleged increase in the size of the informal sector that is presumed to offer 
worse working conditions and lower wages.  
Finally, at the end of section 3 we briefly discuss a small set of recent theoretical studies 
that have offered alternative explanations for the increasing inequality in developing countries.  
  7Since our focus is mostly empirical, we discuss these theories only briefly, as empirical support 
for them is still pending. 
 
(c)  Poverty:  While the literature on trade and inequality is voluminous, there is virtually no 
work to date on the relationship between trade liberalization and poverty.  Yet, the effect of free 
trade on poverty fairs prominently in the mind of the public. Increased inequality seems more 
acceptable if it is accompanied by fast growth so that – despite rising disparities – the poor do 
better in an absolute sense. 
  As has been repeatedly pointed out by Deaton (2003) and Ravallion (2003), an 
operational definition of poverty raises itself important philosophical and measurement issues.  
We do not review these issues here since they have been extensively explored in the work of the 
aforementioned authors.  When we use the term “poverty” in the remainder of this article we do 
so with the concept of “absolute” poverty in mind.  This is not based on our belief that an 
absolute criterion for the measurement of poverty is conceptually the “right” yardstick.  But 
given that a relative measure of poverty is by nature similar to a measure of inequality, most of 
the issues related to trade and “relative” poverty would be covered already in the section on 
inequality. 
  Identifying the relationship between poverty and trade liberalization poses a tremendous 
challenge.  To begin with, poverty has proven hard to measure – even harder than inequality.  
This is not surprising given that - when an absolute poverty line is used - poverty measurement 
requires getting the per capita income or consumption figures exactly right, or at a minimum 
measuring them consistently over time.  This is a difficult task. Consequently, even though most 
agree that worldwide poverty has declined, there is little consensus to date about the magnitude 
of the decline. 
Moreover, the most important channel through which poverty is likely to be affected is 
through growth. As discussed above, the relationship between trade and growth has itself been 
empirically elusive leaving little hope that one can establish a further link to poverty.  Finally, 
most of the world’s poor are found in rural areas (see World Bank (2000), p. 280). In Colombia 
for example, World Bank sources estimate (using the (liberal) $2 per day absolute poverty line) 
that in 1988 13% of urban residents lived in poverty, while the corresponding percentage for 
rural areas was 50%. By 1999 these numbers had evolved to 12% and 42% respectively (World 
  8Bank (2002), p. 12).   This concentration of poverty in rural areas is destined to frustrate any 
efforts to empirically link operational measures of trade liberalization to poverty for two main 
reasons. 
  First, on the data side, most household surveys (at least in Latin America) predominately 
cover urban households, making any assessment of the effect of trade policy on the rural poverty 
difficult.
6  More importantly, the recent trade liberalization episodes in developing countries that 
have been exploited in the context of the inequality debate were concentrated on the 
manufacturing sector, which tends to be located around urban areas.  For example, in Colombia, 
average tariffs in manufacturing dropped from 50 to 13 percent between 1984 and 1998 (with 
sectors such as textile and apparel experiencing over 70 percentage point tariff decline).  During 
the same period, average tariffs in agriculture declined by less then 14 percentage points from 25 
to 10.7 percent.  Accordingly, it is hard to establish any direct link between tariff- or NTB-
reductions and poverty measures in rural areas, at least in the short or medium run.  To the extent 
that trade liberalization did affect the rural poor, this link is likely indirect, through immigration 
and increased employment opportunities in growing sectors.  But then we are back to the growth 
debate. 
A further difficulty is that existing research predominately focuses on the impact of 
unilateral trade liberalization in developing countries.  However, various policies in developed 
countries, such as export and production subsidies, import tariffs, and quotas that shelter 
agricultural and food products in the developed world from foreign competition potentially also 
have important implications for poverty in developing countries, especially in rural areas.  World 
Bank (2000), for example, views the removal of these protectionist measures as an important tool 
in combating global poverty, and simulations based on computable general equilibrium models 
suggest large welfare gains stemming from the removal of such barriers (Anderson (2003)).  Yet, 
we are not aware of any empirical studies that analyze the implications of these policies for the 
well-being of the rural poor in developing countries by linking intertemporal variation in trade 
policy measures to household surveys that span trade liberalization episodes.   
Given the above difficulties, a perhaps more promising approach is to focus on particular 
phenomena that are presumably highly correlated with poverty, and try to establish a link 
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focus on labor market and consumption effects that may fall disproportionately on the poor, and 
review evidence of how trade liberalization may have affected unemployment; wages of 
unskilled workers, employment in the informal sector; compliance with minimum wage 
legislation; child labor; and relative prices of consumer goods.  This approach does not relate 
trade to poverty measures directly.  Furthermore, it admittedly says little about what we believe 
is the most important channel through which poverty is likely to be affected, namely growth.  
But consistent with the spirit of the section on inequality, we place emphasis on those aspects of 
the relationship between trade and poverty that we have some hope of capturing empirically.  In 
the same section, we also review the only empirical study (Porto 2004a) that has to our 
knowledge provided a general equilibrium analysis of the relationship between trade 
liberalization and poverty, by simultaneously considering the labor market and consumption 
effects of trade liberalization.  Section 5 concludes. 
 
3.  Trade Liberalization and Inequality 
3.1 Explanations for the Increase of the Skill Premium 
 
(1) Changes in the Returns to Skill-Intensive Occupations 
 
A possible explanation for the increase in the skill premium documented in many developing 
countries is that the returns to particular occupations that require a higher level of education have 
increased.  Cragg and Epelbaum (1996) find strong support for this hypothesis in the case of pre-
NAFTA Mexico.  In particular, these authors document a rapid increase in the occupational 
premia of professionals and administrators (including public administrators). More importantly, 
these changing premia to skill-intensive occupations account for a significant fraction of the 
estimated skill premium increase: controlling for occupation compresses the original estimate of 
the change in the premium of post-secondary to secondary education from 67 to 40%. Similarly, 
the increase in the premium of post-secondary to primary education drops from 70% to 42% 
once occupation is controlled for. 
  The authors attribute the increase in these occupational premia to the rapid changes 
introduced in the economy by reforms that increased the demand for individuals who could enact 
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impacted these changing returns to occupation only to the extent that they were part of the 
general reforms that generated demand for highly educated individuals. 
  Studies on other countries have however found less support for rapidly changing returns 
to skill-intensive occupations.  In Colombia, Attanasio, Goldberg, and Pavcnik (2004) document 
that occupational returns remained relatively stable over the 1986-1998 period. And while, 
consistent with Cragg and Epelbaum’s story there is a spike in the returns to “managers and other 
professionals” in 1992, a year following dramatic trade and labor reform, this spike is short-lived 
and cannot explain the increase in the skill premium in the late 1980’s and 1990’s.  Hence, other 
factors must drive the increase in the skill premium in this case.  
 
(2) Stolper-Samuelson Effects 
 
The idea that trade liberalization could be the cause of the rising skill premium documented in 
many developing countries is often dismissed on the grounds that the most widely used model of 
international trade, the Heckscher-Ohlin model, would imply exactly the opposite, namely a 
decrease in the wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers.   
The usual premise is that developed countries are relatively abundant in skilled labor, 
while developing countries are relatively abundant in unskilled labor. Hence, according to a 
simple 2x2 version of the Heckscher-Ohlin model, developing countries will specialize in the 
production of unskilled-labor-intensive products (for example textiles and footwear), while 
developed countries will specialize in skilled-labor intensive products (for example machinery). 
A direct implication of this simple version of the model is also that developing countries will 
import skilled-labor intensive products, and – to the extent that they use any trade barriers – 
these trade barriers will be imposed on the skilled-labor-intensive import sector. Trade-reform-
induced declines in protection will thus lower the relative price of the skilled-labor intensive 
imported good.  According to the Stolper-Samuelson theorem that links product prices to wages 
in a Hecksher-Ohlin model, the price decrease in the import sector will reduce the wages of 
skilled workers (used intensively in the import-competing sector) and benefit the unskilled 
  11workers (used intensively in the export sector).
7  Because the model assumes that the factors of 
production can move across sectors within a country, the price changes affect only the economy-
wide returns to factors of production.  Thus, trade liberalization should be associated with 
reductions in poverty and inequality in developing world.  The increase in the skill premium and 
inequality in many developing countries in the aftermath of trade liberalization thus at first 
glance contradicts the prediction of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. 
However, this increase in the skill premium in many developing countries (and in Latin 
America in particular) is consistent with the Stolper-Samuelson theorem because unskilled-labor 
intensive sectors were protected with the highest tariffs prior to trade reform and experienced the 
largest tariff reductions during trade reform.  These protection patterns have been reported for 
Colombia (Attanasio, Goldberg, Pavcnik (2004)), Mexico (Hanson and Harrison (1999), 
Robertson (2000, 2004 for pre-NAFTA period), Morocco (Currie and Harrison (1997)), and 
Brazil (Pavcnik, Blom, Goldberg and Schady (2004)).  Given this evidence, the increase in the 
skill premium is exactly what Stolper-Samuelson would predict: since trade liberalization was 
concentrated in unskilled-labor-intensive sectors, the economy-wide return to unskilled labor 
should decrease.  This argument demonstrates the advantages of exploiting the sectoral variation 
in tariff changes, as opposed to relying on time variation alone to identify the effects of trade 
policy changes.  Studies that simply use “before-after-comparisons” to uncover the effects of 
trade liberalization miss the important fact that – unlike in textbooks of International Trade – the 
comparison is not between autarky and free trade, but rather between protection and “less-
protection”, so that the pattern of protection across sectors prior to liberalization is crucial in 
determining the effects of trade reforms. 
  The above evidence alone, however, is not sufficient to conclude that the increase in the 
skill premium was driven by trade reforms via the Hecksher-Ohlin mechanism.  In fact, other 
pieces of evidence cast doubt on this explanation.  First, the Hecksher-Ohlin model implies that 
industries that experience a tariff-induced decline (increase) in their relative price would contract 
(expand). Consequently, labor should reallocate from the sectors with the largest tariff cuts to the 
sectors with the smaller tariff cuts.  Yet, a common finding of studies of trade liberalization in 
developing countries is the lack of such reallocation.  For example, in Colombia, a regression of 
                                                 
7These sharp predictions of the simple 2x2 version of the model are not necessarily preserved in higher-dimensional 
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coefficient that is small in magnitude and statistically insignificant (Attanasio, Goldberg, and 
Pavcnik (2004).  The lack of labor reallocation following trade reform has also been observed in 
several other developing countries (specifically, by Revenga (1997), Hanson and Harrison 
(1999), and Feliciano (2001) for Mexico; by Currie and Harrison (1997) for Morocco; and by 
Wacziarg and Seddon (2004) in a cross-country study of trade liberalization, where, however, 
trade liberalization is captured only through a time dummy).  These studies attribute the lack of 
labor reallocation in response to trade reform to either rigid labor markets (so that the adjustment 
to trade liberalization occurs through relative wage adjustments (Colombia, Mexico)), or to the 
existence of imperfect product markets (so that firms respond by lowering of profit margins 
(Mexico, Morocco) and not through labor reallocation across sectors).  In sharp contrast, 
Grossman (1986) and Revenga (1992) find greater employment than wage sensitivity to trade 
shocks for the U.S.  These differences in the adjustment mechanisms are consistent with greater 
labor mobility in the United States compared to the developing economies.  
  A second piece of evidence that seems inconsistent with Stolper-Samuelson effects is that 
empirical work on developing countries typically finds that the share of skilled workers has 
increased substantially within most industries in the last two decades.  Within-industry increases 
in the share of skilled workers have been reported for Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Chile, and 
Colombia (Robbins (1996), Sanchez-Paramo and Schady (2003), Attanasio, Goldberg, Pavcnik 
(2004)).  Stolper-Samuelson effects would in contrast suggest that firms should substitute away 
from skilled labor given the higher relative price of skilled workers (rising skill premium).  The 
higher share of skilled workers in most industries points to skilled-biased technological change, 
an explanation that has received a lot of attention in the context of the rising inequality in 
developed countries.
8  
  Even though the aforementioned stylized facts seem more consistent with skill-biased 
technological change than Stolper-Samuelson effects following trade reforms, trade liberalization 
could still have contributed to the rise in the skill premium if technological change had itself 
been an endogenous response to more “openness”. We investigate this possibility later in this 
section. 
                                                 
8 Leamer (1998) argues that sector-bias and not factor-bias determines changes in the wage distribution.  This 
argument however requires that product prices do not change, which is unlikely the case during a trade reform. 
Moreover, there has been no empirical support for this theory (see Attanasio, Goldberg, and Pavcnik (2004)). 
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(3) Relocation of Intermediate-Goods Production or “Global Production Sharing”, FDI, 
and Complementarity between Capital and Labor 
 
The discussion of the general equilibrium mechanism linking trade policy to changes in relative 
wages has so far implicitly assumed (as is typically done in this literature) that all trade occurs in 
final goods. This premise is seriously questioned in Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 2003) who point 
to the importance of trade in intermediate goods, and argue that the increase in “global 
production sharing” or outsourcing can in part account for the increased demand for skilled 
workers in both the developed and developing countries.  
  The basic argument in Feenstra and Hanson rests on the assumption that production of 
final goods requires the use of intermediate inputs that differ in their skill intensities. Trade 
liberalization and/or removal of capital controls shift the production of some of these 
intermediate goods from developed to developing countries. While such products would be 
characterized as unskilled-labor-intensive from a developed country’s perspective, they appear 
skilled-labor-intensive when considered from the developing country’s point of view. As a result, 
the average skill intensity increases in both the developed and developing economies, inducing 
an increase in the skill premium in both places.  
  A more general version of the above argument emphasizes the role of foreign direct 
investment (not necessarily linked to the production of intermediate products) in generating 
additional demand for skilled workers in developing countries.  If capital and skilled labor are 
complements, lower prices of capital goods induced by trade liberalization will increase demand 
not only for capital goods but also for skilled labor (Cragg and Epelbaum (1996), Behrman, 
Birdsall, and Szekely (2000)).  
  Empirical work has found strong support for the “global production sharing” hypothesis 
for Mexico, where many U.S. firms export intermediate inputs to maquiladora plants, in which 
the assembly of inputs and other production activities occur (see Feenstra and Hanson (1997)). 
However, we are not aware of any other studies linking the increase in inequality observed in 
developing countries to outsourcing.  This is partly due to the fact that most empirical work has 
focused on the role of outsourcing in the developed rather than developing countries.  But it 
could also reflect the fact there are few developing countries that have received as large FDI 
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The size of FDI flows to Mexico could be due to Mexico’s substantial investment liberalization 
in addition to the reduction of tariff and NTBs during the 1980s, and to its proximity to the 
United States. 
 
(4) Skill-Biased Technological Change 
 
The evidence in favor of skilled-biased technological change does not necessarily imply that 
trade policy did not indirectly contribute to changes in the wage distribution. Of course, it is 
possible that there has been worldwide skill-biased technological change, independent of trade 
opening, so that inequality would increase in the absence of trade reform.  If, however, 
technological change was itself an endogenous response to more “openness”, one could argue 
that the trade reforms were indirectly responsible for the increase in the skill premium.    
Several recent theoretical papers have explored channels through which trade openness 
may have induced or at least contributed to skill-biased technological change. The earliest of 
them include Wood’s (1995) hypothesis of “defensive innovation”, according to which 
intensified competition from abroad may induce firms to engage in R&D, or at a minimum, take 
advantage of existing new technologies that they may have had little incentive to adopt prior to 
liberalization. This argument is developed further in Thoenig and Verdier (2003). While this 
hypothesis seems more suitable to explaining the increase in inequality in the developed world, it 
may also be applicable to middle-income developing countries, such as Colombia or Brazil, if 
they face import competition in their low-skill-intensive sectors from low-income developing 
countries (e.g., China), so that they find it necessary to protect these sectors.  On the empirical 
side, a common implication of these models is that in the short- and medium-run, skill-biased 
technological change should be more pronounced in the sectors that liberalized more. 
A somewhat different mechanism through which trade liberalization can induce (or 
accelerate) skill-biased technological change is put forward in Acemoglu (2003) who develops a 
model of endogenous technological change, and argues that in the case of developing countries 
this technological change may take the form of increased imports of machines, office equipment, 
and other capital goods that are complementary to skilled labor. Trade liberalization affects the 
demand for skilled workers by reducing the prices of the relevant capital goods and hence 
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implications: first, following a trade liberalization episode in a developing country, total imports 
for office equipment and advanced machinery from developed countries should increase; and 
second, the increase in the demand for skilled workers should be more pronounced in sectors that 
import more foreign machinery. 
Yet another mechanism through which trade liberalization can affect technological 
change and thus indirectly inequality is suggested by Aghion, Burgess, Redding and Zilibotti 
(2003). In their model firms’ response to trade liberalization depends on how close they are to 
the technology frontier. Firms that are sufficiently close to the frontier can survive or deter entry 
of (foreign) competitors by innovating; firms that are far from the frontier may not be able to 
fight external entry. Hence, the average effect of trade liberalization will depend on the fraction 
of firms and sectors that are sufficiently close to the frontier to fight for their survival. In 
addition, Aghion, Burgess, Redding, and Zilibotti emphasize the role of domestic institutions, 
labor market restrictions in particular, and their interactions with technology adoption for the 
distributional effects of trade policy. 
Finally, a different line of explanation focuses on the increased exports from developing 
countries following trade reforms.  Empirical evidence from the United States suggests that 
exporting is a skill-intensive activity (see Bernard and Jensen (1997)); to the extent that this is 
also true for the developing countries, an increase in exports will increase the relative demand for 
skilled labor.  In fact, empirical evidence from Mexico by Harrison and Hanson (1999) finds a 
positive association between a firm’s exporting status and the relative employment of white-
collar workers during a period of trade liberalization.    
While empirical work on the effects of trade alone, or skilled-biased technological 
change alone on inequality has been abundant, empirical studies of the interactions of these two 
mechanisms are scant. Attanasio, Goldberg, and Pavcnik (2004) find some support for the Wood 
/ Thoenig and Verdier theory for Colombia. In particular, regressions relating the change in the 
share of skilled workers in each sector to the change in tariff protection over the 1984-1998 
period show that the increase in demand for skilled workers was largest in those sectors that 
experienced the largest tariff cuts (e.g., textiles and apparel).  This provides some support for the 
theory that skilled-biased technological change was itself an endogenous response to trade 
liberalization. Lack of data on machinery or office equipment purchases prevent the authors from 
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this channel might play a role in some countries.  For the period surrounding the 1980’s Mexican 
trade liberalization episode, Harrison and Hanson (1999) find that, within each Mexican 
industry, firms that import machinery and materials are more likely to employ a higher share of 
white-collar workers than firms that do not import these inputs.  Pavcnik (2003), on the other 
hand, finds that the increased relative plant demand for white-collar workers by Chilean plants in 
early 1980’s cannot be attributed to the use of imported materials and foreign technical 
assistance by these plants, once one controls for time-invariant plant characteristics.   
In the empirical part of their paper, Aghion, Burgess, Redding and Zilibotti (2003) look 
at the Indian trade liberalization of 1991 for support of their theory.  Consistent with their 
theoretical arguments, productivity and profits increased by more in 3-digit industries that were 
close to the Indian productivity frontier and in states that had more flexible labor market 
institutions.
9  This differential impact of trade liberalization across industries with different 
proximity to the technology frontier and states with different regulatory regimes had strong 
inequalizing effects.  
To our knowledge, no other work has attempted to relate skilled-biased technological 
change, as measured by the increase in the share of skilled workers by sector, to trade 
liberalization in developing world. Clearly, more evidence from other developing countries is 
needed before one can draw general conclusions. Along the same lines, no empirical studies have 
linked skilled-biased technological change in developing countries to the rise in aggregate 
exports. However, some recent work has focused on the changing composition of exports as a 
driving force of inequality.  We refer to this work in more detail in the next subsection. 
 
(5) Compositional Changes: “Quality” upgrading of firms and/or products 
 
As discussed above, a common and puzzling finding of studies of trade liberalization in 
developing countries is the lack of labor reallocation across sectors.  This lack of movement is in 
stark contrast with the results of studies of the effects of trade reform on productivity that exploit 
plant- or firm-level data.  The latter studies document major resource reallocations across firms 
                                                 
9However, using firm-level data and detailed information on industry tariffs from India, Topalova (2004) concludes 
that tariff declines are associated with productivity improvements in firms with high and low productivity prior to 
the trade reform.     
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productive firms (often within the same industry), so that aggregate industry productivity 
increases.  One possibility to reconcile these seemingly conflicting findings on factor mobility is 
that there is a lot of labor movement across firms, often within the same industry, that are not 
visible at the aggregation level at which industry of employment is reported in household 
surveys.   
Recent work has increasingly focused on compositional changes in response to trade 
liberalization that may induce reallocation of both capital and labor towards “higher quality” 
firms.  The basic idea is that trade openness induces a “quality” upgrading of firms, where 
quality can mean either “firm productivity” or “product quality”.  No matter what interpretation 
one adopts, what is essential for establishing a connection with the inequality debate is that these 
“higher quality” firms employ a higher proportion of skilled workers, so that aggregate demand 
for skilled workers increases relative to that for unskilled workers. The quality upgrading in 
response to trade openness can itself arise either because firms in import competing sectors try to 
avoid competition from cheaper countries by differentiating themselves, or because trade can 
shift resources from non-exporters to exporters (see Melitz (2003) for a related argument), and 
there is ample empirical evidence that exporters tend to be more “productive” than non-
exporters. 
  Despite the theoretical appeal and plausibility of these arguments that emphasize firm and 
plant heterogeneity, the empirical evidence on how this channel affects inequality is still scant 
and mostly indirect.  Schott (2004) provides strong evidence of complete specialization by 
countries within product categories, with the skill- and capital-abundant countries specializing in 
the production and export of higher unit value products, and unskilled-labor-abundant countries 
specializing in the production and export of low-unit value products. If one accepts the plausible 
premise that unit values within very narrowly defined product categories (based on 7-digit Tariff 
Schedule code and 10-digit Harmonized System code), reflect differences in product “quality”, 
then the implication of Schott’s findings is that developed countries specialize in higher quality 
products while developing countries specialize in lower quality products within the same product 
category.  While these findings do not tell us directly how countries adjust to trade liberalization, 
it seems plausible to assume that as developing countries become more open to trade, they 
engage in more product differentiation along the same lines as more developed countries. 
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(2004). Rather than focusing on trade liberalization, Verhoogen exploits a major exchange rate 
depreciation episode (the 1994 peso crisis in Mexico) to study the response of firms to increased 
openness. The peso depreciation clearly benefited exporters.  Instead of focusing on the effects 
of an increase in aggregate exports on productivity or demand for skilled workers (see related 
discussion in previous section), Verhoogen considers the effects of the exchange rate 
depreciation on firms of different “quality”.  Quality is defined as “product quality”.  The basic 
hypothesis is that the increase in exports was associated with an increase in the quality of the 
products produced by exporting firms.  But higher quality products require a higher proportion of 
skilled workers.  Hence the relative demand for skilled workers increased, widening the wage 
gap between skilled and unskilled.  Moreover, Verhoogen finds that high and low quality firms 
experienced similar wage inequality growth patterns during time periods without large exchange 
rate shocks.  This robustness analysis confirms that the main findings do not simply reflect pre-
existing time trends in wage inequality growth that varied across the two types of firms 
(potentially due to differences in unobserved characteristics), but they were truly the result of 
firms’ differential responses to the exchange rate shock. 
  The main challenge of this literature is to define “quality” in an operational way.  As 
Erdem and Tybout (2004) have pointed out, a separation of “firm productivity” and what we 
typically mean by “product quality” is not possible given the available data sets.  Moreover, the 
term “quality” is itself elusive from an empirical point of view, especially in the context of a 
horizontal differentiation model, in which consumers value products differently. Schott (2004) 
tries to circumvent this problem by using unit-value data and assuming that higher unit-values 
reflect higher quality.  Verhoogen (2004) assumes that higher quantity (a plant’s total sales) can 
proxy for higher “product quality”, a clearly controversial assumption. Fortunately, from the 
perspective of the inequality debate, it does not matter what definition of “quality” one adopts. 
What matters is the proportion of skilled and unskilled workers that is required to produce goods 
before and after a trade liberalization, or currency depreciation episode.  If the proportion of 
skilled workers increases within firms, this is going to induce an increase in the skill premium.  
Hence, rather than resorting to particular interpretations of product “quality” that may be 
controversial, empirical work in this area could directly examine how within-firm relative 
demand for skilled workers is affected by trade liberalization, and whether this effect is different 
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observed prior to the trade reform or exchange rate depreciation episode). 
  The second challenge facing this literature is of course that for the results to be relevant 
for the inequality debate, it is important to have accurate measures of skill.  Unfortunately, the 
information on worker and job characteristics provided in firm level data sets is much more 
limited that what is usually provided in household surveys, so that researchers have to resort to 
the familiar dichotomy between production and non-production workers. While in the absence of 
more detailed information, there is little one can do in the short run, in the longer run more 
information about the characteristics of workers employed by different firms (or plants) will be 
essential for establishing a connection between firm heterogeneity and changes in the wage 
distribution. 
 
3.2 Changes in Industry Wage Premiums 
 
As discussed in section 2, empirical evidence suggests that the increase in the economy-
wide skill-premium alone (regardless of the underlying causes) cannot fully explain the growing 
wage inequality.  In this section, we consider industry wage premiums as an alternative channel 
through which trade liberalization may have contributed to wage inequality. 
Industry wage premiums refer to the part of worker wages that cannot be explained by 
observable worker characteristics such as gender, age, education, experience, etc., but can be 
attributed to workers’ industry affiliation.  Many studies have found that industry wage 
premiums account for a significant portion of individual wage variation; however, there is less 
agreement as to whether these premiums reflect compensating differentials, efficiency wages, 
industry rents, or returns to industry-specific skills.  
Trade theory suggests several plausible channels through which trade policy changes may 
affect industry wage premiums.  First, in short- and medium-run models of trade where workers 
cannot easily move across sectors, tariff cuts translate into proportional declines in industry wage 
premiums.  This channel may be particularly important in developing countries, where labor 
mobility in the aftermath of a trade shock may be obstructed by labor market rigidities (Heckman 
and Pages (2000)).  In principle, these labor market rigidities might not be important in practice 
because of vast non-compliance with labor market regulation. However, the lack of labor 
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discussed in section 3 is consistent with the idea of rigid labor markets.  In addition, these studies 
find that the observed changes in the industry shares in total employment are not correlated with 
tariff changes.  Thus, the idea that the industries affected by trade reforms may adjust via the 
wage, rather than the employment channel, deserves some consideration. 
Second, while the traditional short- and medium- run models of trade assume perfect 
competition, trade policy may also affect industry wage premiums in settings with imperfect 
competition in product and labor markets.  For example, profitable industries may share part of 
their rents with workers because of union bargaining power.  If tariff cuts are associated with 
lower markups, industry wage premiums could decline via lower industry rents.  In fact, 
Harrison (1994), Levinsohn (1993), and Currie and Harrison (1997) find that firms’ markups 
decline in response to trade liberalization for Cote d’Ivoire, Turkey, and Morocco, respectively.  
Moreover, industry wage premiums may be affected by trade policy in models where unions 
share in industry rents through employment security guarantees rather than wages, and where 
employment security is obtained through higher trade protection (Grossman (1984)).   
Finally, trade policy could affect industry wage premiums via industry-level productivity 
changes.  While theory suggests that trade liberalization could either increase or decrease 
productivity, recent empirical studies suggest that trade liberalization is associated with 
productivity improvements in developing countries (Harrison (1994) for Cote d’Ivoire, Krishna 
and Mitra (1998), Aghion, Burgess, Redding, Zilibotti (2003), and Topalova (2003) for India, 
Kim (2000) for Korea, Pavcnik for Chile (2002), Fernandes for Colombia (2003), Muendler 
(2004) and Hay (2001) for Brazil).  If these productivity gains are shared with workers in the 
form of higher wages, trade liberalization could increase industry wage premiums in sectors that 
experienced largest tariff cuts.   
Regardless of the exact source of industry wage premium changes, trade-liberalization 
induced changes in industry wage premiums could contribute to increases in the wage inequality 
between skilled and unskilled workers through two channels.   
First, if trade liberalization leads to declines in industry wage premiums, wage inequality 
between skilled and unskilled workers could increase if the industries with the largest tariff cuts 
are the ones employing a higher share of unskilled workers and if these industries had the lowest 
wage premiums prior to the reform.  Evidence on how responsive industry wage premiums are to 
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premiums (Feliciano (2001) for Mexico, Pavcnik, Blom, Goldberg, and Schady (2004) for 
Brazil), while others find a positive association between tariff declines and industry wage 
premiums (Goldberg and Pavcnik (2004) for Colombia).
10  Feliciano (2001) reports a positive 
association between declines in import licenses and industry wage premiums.  Thus, in Colombia 
and Mexico, trade liberalization could in principle lead to increased wage inequality through the 
industry wage premium channel, especially since tariff cuts in these countries were the largest in 
unskilled-labor intensive industries (see section 3 for details) and the sectors with the largest 
tariff cuts had the lowest wage premiums prior to the reform (Attanasio, Goldberg, and Pavcnik 
(2004)).  However, the magnitudes of the effects are relatively small, especially when compared 
to relatively large increases in wage inequality.  For example, in Colombia, the estimates suggest 
that the average tariff reduction in manufacturing sector of 37 percentage points would be 
associated with 4% decline in industry wage premium.  Moreover, in Colombia, industry wage 
premiums account for about 2% of explained variation in log hourly wages conditional on 
workers’ observable characteristics.  Thus, while changes in industry wages contribute to the 
increase in wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers, other sources likely play a 
more important role. 
  Second, industry-wage premium changes could also contribute to the growing wage 
inequality between skilled and unskilled workers if they vary across workers with different skill 
levels, and if trade liberalization is associated with increases in industry-specific skill premiums.  
Sector-specific skill premiums could, for example, arise if workers with different skills differ in 
their intersectoral mobility, accumulation of sector-specific human capital, or bargaining power.  
However, the existing empirical evidence finds little support for this channel.  In Brazil, Pavcnik, 
Blom, Goldberg, and Schady (2004) find that skill premiums vary widely across sectors.
11  
Attanasio, Goldberg, and Pavcnik (2004) find this to a lesser extent for Colombia. Yet, in both 
cases, changes in sector-specific skill premiums are not correlated with sector-specific tariff 
reductions. 
                                                 
10Studies that rely on average firm or industry wages rather than industry wage premiums also report mixed results: 
no association between changes in industry wages and tariffs in Morocco (Currie and Harrison (1997) and positive 
association in Mexico (Revenga (1997)).   
11For example, the standard deviation of industry wage premiums ranges between 10 to 20 percent in various years. 
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wage premiums contributed to the growing wage inequality between skilled and unskilled 
workers in these countries. However, the responsiveness of industry wage premiums to tariff cuts 
differs across countries, and it is generally estimated to be small.  One potential explanation for 
the relatively small magnitude of industry wage responses and the lack of labor reallocation 
across sectors is the existence of the informal sector.  This sector offers an additional margin 
through which firms can adjust to trade shocks.  We explore how trade liberalization affects the 
informal sector and the potential importance of the informal sector in explaining trade-induced 
wage inequality next. 
 
3.3 Changes in the size of the informal sector 
 
  Trade liberalization could also increase wage inequality by expanding the size of the 
informal sector. The informal sector is usually defined as the sector of the economy that does not 
comply with labor market regulation such as minimum wage laws, hiring/firing regulations, or 
minimum age laws, and does not provide worker benefits.  A broader definition of the informal 
sector may also include temporary workers in formal establishments.  In many developing 
countries, the informal sector actually accounts for a large share of the labor force.  For example, 
in urban Colombia, 50 to 60% of the labor force is employed in the informal sector.
12
Opponents of globalization often claim that globalization might increase wage inequality 
by reducing firms’ compliance with labor standards and increasing the informal sector of the 
economy.  In particular, their argument suggest that firms that are exposed to foreign competition 
and need to cut costs may do so by not complying with labor market regulation or by replacing 
permanent workers with temporary ones.  Alternatively, these firms may circumvent labor 
market regulation by outsourcing their activities to smaller, informal firms.  Or, firms in the 
formal sector may lay-off workers, who in turn obtain informal jobs.  From a theoretical 
standpoint, one potential problem with such arguments is the question of why profit maximizing 
firms had not cut costs by switching toward informal workers prior to the reforms.  Goldberg and 
Pavcnik (2003) present a model that formalizes the above arguments of globalization opponents 
                                                 
12In the Colombian labor market survey, a worker is considered to work in the informal sector if his/her employer 
does not contribute to the social security fund as required by the law.   
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sector.
13   
If trade liberalization increases the probability of working in the informal sector, and if 
the informal sector is associated with lower wages and worse job quality, trade liberalization 
could in principle contribute to increased inequality, where inequality is broadly defined as the 
gap between individuals that hold jobs with good working conditions, benefits, higher wages and 
those that do not.   
Very little empirical work has examined the relationship between trade liberalization and 
the informal employment.  This partially reflects the scarcity of labor force surveys that contain 
sufficient information to distinguish between formal and informal workers.  Moreover, the 
existing results should be interpreted with several caveats.  First, while the definition of the 
informal sector in various studies captures the broad idea of non-compliance with the labor 
market regulation, the exact source of non-compliance may differ across countries.
14  One should 
thus be cautious about comparison of results across studies from different countries.  Second, the 
surveyed empirical work in general focuses on non-compliance with economic labor standards 
such as social security benefits, severance payments, and minimum wage laws and not 
compliance with core labor standards such as forced and compulsory labor laws and child labor 
laws. Finally, the empirical work is based on household surveys and will miss individuals that do 
not live within households that are in the sampling frame.  Particularly vulnerable groups include 
bonded laborers and street children who are likely missing from the data.   
Before we review the evidence on the relationship between trade liberalization and the 
size of the informal sector, let us first address the controversial issue of whether the informal 
sector is indeed associated with lower wages and lower job quality.  Several studies conclude 
that workers with the same observable characteristics earn less in the informal than formal sector 
in Peru and El Salvador (Marcouiller, Ruiz de Castilla, and Woodruff (1997)), Brazil (table 3, 
Pavcnik, Blom, Goldberg, and Schady (2004)) and Colombia (table 3, Attanasio, Goldberg, and 
Pavcnik (2004)).
  For example, in Colombia, a worker in the informal sector earns between 1.7 to 
                                                 
13One can also think of models which yield the opposite predictions.  The main point of the model is to show that the 
view held by many globalization opponents can be theoretically justified.   
14For example, in Colombia, a worker is defined as working in the informal sector if his/her employer does not 
contribute social security taxes into his/her social security fund.  In Brazil, the definition of informality is based on 
whether a worker has a signed work card.  A signed worked card entitles the worked to legislated benefits and 
rights. 
  2413 percent less than a worker with the same observable characteristics and industry affiliation in 
the formal sector (depending on a year).  Of course, one cannot interpret this negative association 
between work in the informal sector and log hourly wages as causal, since people may self-select 
into the informal sector based on unobservable characteristics that also independently affect 
wages.  Moreover, the claim that informal jobs are of lower quality and less desirable is 
controversial.  For example, individuals that value flexible hours might consider informal work 
arrangements superior to formal ones and might voluntarily seek informal jobs.  A special 
module on Quality of Employment from 1994 Colombian National Household Survey contains 
various questions about job satisfaction and work conditions that yield several descriptive 
statistics about the quality of jobs in the formal and informal jobs as perceived by the workers.  
These statistics suggest that workers in the informal sector are more likely to be less satisfied 
with working conditions, employee relations, job characteristics, and are much less likely to 
report receiving any benefits than formal workers (Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003)).   
  We should emphasize that unskilled workers are more likely than skilled workers to 
participate in the informal sector.  In Colombia for example, workers with complete secondary or 
university education are less likely to work in the informal sector than less educated workers, 
conditional on other worker characteristics and industry of employment (Table 4b, Goldberg and 
Pavcnik (2003)).  Similarly in Brazil, workers with complete university degree are less likely to 
participate in the informal sector than less educated workers (Table 4a, Goldberg and Pavcnik 
(2003)).  Of course, people may self-select into the informal sector based on unobservable 
characteristics that also independently affect educational attainment.  Nevertheless, this evidence 
suggests that the informal sector disproportionately employs less educated workers, who are 
more likely positioned towards the bottom of the wage distribution.  Because workers in the 
informal sector earn lower wages than workers with the same observable characteristics in the 
formal sector, unskilled (i.e., less educated) workers receive lower wages than skilled workers 
not only because of the increase in the skill premium, but also because they are 
disproportionately employed in the informal sector.   
Overall, while the above evidence is only descriptive, it is consistent with the view that 
the informal sector employs a disproportionate share of unskilled workers and is associated with 
lower quality jobs.  Thus, trade liberalization could at least in principle lead to greater inequality 
if tariff cuts are associated with increased probability of working in the informal sector. 
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informal work is mixed.  Currie and Harrison (1997) find that public-sector firms hire a greater 
share of temporary workers following a trade liberalization episode in Morocco.  Goldberg and 
Pavcnik (2003) find that conditional on worker observable characteristics, tariff declines are not 
associated with increases in probability of working in the informal sector in Brazil.  However in 
Colombia, where labor markets are believed to be more rigid than in Brazil (Heckman and Pages 
(2000)), they find a negative association between tariffs and the probability of working in the 
informal sector, but only for the period preceding the labor market reform that increased the 
flexibility of hiring/firing a worker.   
In sum, the evidence suggests that trade liberalization could contribute to inequality by 
increasing the probability of working in the informal sector.  However, this evidence is not very 
robust across countries and time.  One potential explanation for the differences in the findings 
across markets lies in labor market institutions.  The differences between the findings for Brazil 
and Colombia, and the differences in the response of the informal sector to tariff cuts in 
Colombia before and after the labor market reform in particular are consistent with the view that 
firms are more likely to react to increased market competition by reductions in the formal 
employment when they operate in more rigid labor market.   
Differences in labor market rigidities could stem from several sources.  In the case of 
Brazil and Colombia, differences in the costs of dismissing a worker (such as severance 
payments) may provide part of the explanation for the different findings concerning the effects of 
trade reform on informality. These costs are significantly higher in Colombia than in Brazil 
throughout the 1980’s and 1990’s, and they are higher in Colombia before the 1990 labor market 
reform than in the late 1990’s (see Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003), pages 477-78 for details).  
Other labor market institutions such as unions could in principle also play a role.  Unfortunately, 
the evidence on unionization rates and union bargaining power is mostly anecdotal, because 
information on union membership is not available at the individual level (or even the industry-
level) for Colombia, and it is available only in some years and data sets for Brazil.  This makes 
any attempt to link labor market rigidities to unions empirically evasive.  Nevertheless, we are 
not aware of any claims suggesting that union power has changed during the reform period in 
Colombia and that this change could explain the differences in our findings before and after the 
labor market reform.   
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trade reform, and informality remains an important topic for future research.  Such research 
would be especially valuable if it relied on micro survey data from within a country in a setting 
where labor market institutions vary across administrative units as Besley and Burgess (2004) 
and Aghion, Burgess, Redding, and Zilliboti (2003) have done in their studies of the effects of 
labor market institutions on growth and productivity in the case of India.   
 
3.4  Other Channels Suggested by Recent Theoretical Studies 
 
Motivated by the empirical finding of rising inequality in both the North and South, a number 
of recent theoretical studies have developed models aimed at explaining this increase.  Banerjee 
and Newman (2004) develop a model in which trade patterns and the effects of trade 
liberalization on the income distribution depend on the degree of capital market imperfections. 
An appealing feature of the model is that, just like the specific factors model, it yields clear 
empirical predictions concerning the short- and medium-run adjustment to trade reforms. The 
challenge from an empirical point of view is to find variables that could accurately capture the 
“quality” of capital market in the relevant countries.  
Xu (2002) develops a model with endogenously traded goods, in which the effects of trade 
liberalization on inequality in developing countries is U-shaped; for initially high levels of 
protection, trade liberalization reduces inequality, while for subsequently lower levels of 
protection, trade liberalization increases inequality. The mechanism through which these effects 
operate is a trade-liberalization induced decrease in the range of non-traded goods. This decrease 
can produce ambiguous effects on the relative wages of unskilled workers depending on the 
initial level of trade protection. 
As mentioned above, while the ideas put forward in these models are interesting, empirical 
support for them is still pending.  Further empirical work is needed in order to assess the 
relevance of the competing hypotheses put forward for explaining the rise in inequality in 
particular countries. 
 
4.  Trade Liberalization and Poverty 
 
  27As discussed in section 2, establishing a link between intertemporal variation in trade 
policy measures and an aggregate poverty measure is a difficult task. Perhaps a more 
manageable approach is to relate changes in trade policy to particular phenomena that are highly 
correlated with poverty. To this end, it is instructive to first understand through which channels 
poverty can be affected. 
Trade policy affects household welfare through three main channels:  the participation 
and earnings of household members in labor markets, household consumption, and household 
production.
15  Most empirical studies to date have adopted a partial-equilibrium approach, 
focusing on one channel, or one particular component of a channel, at a time. While the obvious 
limitation of this approach is that it ignores general equilibrium effects, and hence cannot offer 
conclusive evidence as to how poverty is ultimately affected, its appeal lies in its tractability and 
the credibility of the empirical findings. Most of our discussion will therefore focus on such 
partial-equilibrium studies, organizing them according to the channel through which poverty is in 
each case potentially affected. We will however refer to one recent empirical study (Porto 
(2004a)) that employs a general-equilibrium approach to illustrate how labor market and 
consumption effects work together to affect poverty. As in the previous section, our focus will 
remain on short- and medium-run, static, effects that are empirically more tractable, than long-
run dynamic effects, operating through growth. 
 
4.1 Partial Equilibrium Studies: Labor Markets Channel   
 
Most of the existing research on the relationship between trade policy and poverty 
focuses on the role of labor markets via wages and participation.  In particular, trade policy has 
been occasionally blamed for increases in unemployment, changes in the wage distribution that 
may hurt the poor, and a “race to the bottom” that manifests itself in lower compliance with labor 
market standards, more extensive use of part-time and temporary labor, and generally a decrease 
in the job quality of those who remain employed. In the following, we review the evidence on 
each of these issues. 
 
                                                 
15Trade liberalization could also affect poverty by changing government revenue and government transfers to the 
poor.  We abstract from this channel since there is no empirical evidence based on micro data on the topic.  See 
Winters, McCulloch, and McKay (2004, pp. 103-106) for a discussion of this channel.   
  28(1) Trade policy and unemployment 
 
Given that the main trade liberalization episodes of the last two decades were 
concentrated in the manufacturing sectors of developing countries, perhaps the most important 
way through which trade policy could affect the urban poor in the short- and medium-run, is 
through an increase in unemployment. Although the concern about unemployment in the 
aftermath of trade reforms fairs prominently in the public debate on the pros and cons of trade 
liberalization, it is almost absent in the mainstream models of international trade, which typically 
assume full employment.
16 However, when labor markets are characterized by rigidities (as is 
often the case with developing countries), trade policy changes can lead to transitional 
unemployment (see Matusz and Tarr (1999) for a discussion). 
    Unfortunately, on the empirical side, little is known on how changes in trade policy affect 
the probability and duration of transitional unemployment. Existing empirical research on worker 
displacement has focused exclusively on the United States, where data from the Displacement 
Worker Surveys allow one to track the experience of displaced workers (see for example L. 
Kletzer (1998, 2003)).  Even in this case the evidence is only suggestive, as one cannot know 
with certainty whether it was trade-related factors that ultimately led to a worker’s displacement. 
However, the surveys do report the sector of prior employment, so that it is possible to examine 
whether workers employed in sectors facing more intense import competition are more likely to 
lose their jobs.  Using this approach Kletzer infers that higher import competition contributes to 
unemployment (see Kletzer 1998, 2003). Moreover, she finds no evidence that displaced workers 
get re-employed in export-oriented sectors. These findings have potentially important 
implications for poverty, especially since import competing industries in the U.S. employ a 
disproportionate share of unskilled workers.  
  Establishing a clear link between transitional unemployment and trade liberalization is 
substantially harder in developing countries, where worker displacement surveys usually do not 
exist. While some countries have experienced an increase in unemployment following trade 
reforms, this increase is often attributed to macroeconomic recessions rather than trade policy. In 
general, there is very little evidence on the link between trade policy and probability (or 
                                                 
16 A notable exception is the work of Neary (1978, 1982) that explores the consequences of factor specificity in the 
short run.  In Neary’s framework it is possible that factor markets are at disequilibrium in the short run as the 
economy adjusts to a terms-of-trade shock. 
  29duration) of unemployment.  Attanasio, Goldberg, and Pavcnik (2004) examine whether the 
increase in the probability of being unemployed was greater for workers in the manufacturing 
sector (where tariff cuts were the largest) than for workers with the same observable 
characteristics in non-traded-good sectors (such as wholesale and retail trade, restaurants, hotels, 
construction, etc.) in urban Colombia.  They find that increases in the probability of 
unemployment before and after tariff reductions were not larger in manufacturing than in non-
traded sectors.  However, this evidence is based on a very aggregate industry definition, while 
the information on unemployment is not directly linked to changes in trade policy.  Moreover, no 
attempt is made to link changes in probability of unemployment to poverty.  
     The difficulty in relating transitional unemployment to trade policy changes stems from 
the fact that household surveys in developing countries either do not report in which industries 
the currently unemployed used to work, and in which industries they seek new employment, or – 
when they do contain this information – they report the industry at a very aggregate level (1-digit 
ISIC). As a result, it is not possible to relate industry unemployment to more disaggregate tariff 
changes. Moreover, empirical work in this area needs to deal with truncation issues, as workers 
who are employed in any given survey interval, can only be assumed to be employed up to the 
end of the particular survey interval, and, similarly, unemployed workers can be assumed to be 
unemployed only to the extent that they have not found a new job before the end of that survey 
period. Despite these difficulties, a better understanding of the empirical relationship between 
trade policy changes and transitional unemployment is essential for assessing the effects of trade 
liberalization on the “poor”, many of which – at least in urban areas- are likely to be 
unemployed. 
 
(2) Economy-wide changes in the wages of unskilled labor 
 
Within the set of employed workers, it is plausible to assume that unskilled workers are 
more likely to be “poor” compared to skilled workers.  Under this assumption, trade policy will 
affect poverty through the same mechanisms it affects wage inequality between skilled and 
unskilled workers, as long as these mechanisms deliver clear predictions on how trade policy 
affects the absolute demand (and thus absolute wages) for unskilled workers.  Since the previous 
section discusses these mechanisms and related empirical evidence in detail we abstract from 
  30them in our discussion on poverty.  Of course one of the main determinants of absolute demand 
for all workers is growth; but, as pointed out above, this is a channel we want to abstract from in 
the current study. 
  Nevertheless, we should emphasize three caveats.  First, higher wage inequality is not 
necessarily associated with lower wages for unskilled workers, since trade policy could, in 
principle, increase the relative demand for skilled workers without lowering the absolute demand 
for unskilled workers.  Second, since the main goal of most existing studies is to evaluate the 
relevance of trade-related explanations for the increase in wage inequality, the implications of 
the models for absolute wages of unskilled workers are rarely empirically examined.
17  The 
empirical findings might thus not be pertinent to the trade policy and poverty debate.  Third, 
even if trade liberalization is associated with declines (increases) in absolute wages of unskilled 
workers, these wage declines (increases) may not necessarily translate into higher (lower) 
poverty.  The poverty-implications of the changes in unskilled wages will depend on the position 
unskilled wage earners in the country’s income distribution. Moreover, they will depend on how 
the prices of consumer goods change in response to trade liberalization, and on the shares of 
different goods in the consumption basket of the poor.  Unfortunately, most of the existing 
studies abstract from these issues.
18  Establishing a clear link between the wages of unskilled 
workers and poverty is further complicated by the fact that due to data limitations empirical 
studies often restrict themselves to formal workers in the manufacturing sector. 
 
(3) Industry Wages 
 
  Just as increased inequality between skilled and unskilled workers can be associated with 
increased poverty of unskilled workers (in the absolute sense of poverty), a trade-reform-induced 
increase in the inequality between workers employed in different industries can lead to an 
increase in the poverty rate among workers employed in industries that experienced the largest 
declines in industry wage premiums. A necessary condition for this to happen is that the increase 
in inequality is not accompanied by an increase in the absolute demand for workers in these 
sectors that could potentially neutralized the increase in inequality, but such an increase seems 
                                                 
17Verhoogen (2004) is an exception.  
18 A notable exception is Porto (2004a) that we refer to in detail in a subsequent section. 
  31unlikely in the short run. As shown in the previous section, trade liberalization in many 
developing countries was indeed concentrated on sectors that had lower wages to start with, and 
employed more unskilled workers who were more likely positioned close to the bottom of the 
income distribution (at least among the employed).  Thus, trade liberalization could have at least 
in principle contributed to an increase in poverty.  
 
(4) Trade policy and compliance with labor market standards 
 
The opponents of globalization often claim that globalization may elevate poverty by 
reducing firms’ compliance with labor standards and increasing the informal sector of the 
economy.
19  Alternatively, these firms might circumvent labor market regulation by outsourcing 
their activities to smaller, informal firms.    
If the informal sector is associated with lower wages and if trade increases the probability 
of working in this sector, trade liberalizations could in principle be associated with increased 
poverty.  Although our discussion in section 3.3 suggests that workers with the same observable 
characteristics in general earn less in the informal than formal sector, the evidence on the effects 
of trade policy on the size of the informal sector is mixed. 
Moreover, labor market institutions such as the minimum wage are more likely to be 
binding for the individuals at the bottom of the wage distribution. If greater trade were associated 
with lower compliance with minimum wage laws, greater trade could increase poverty.  Harrison 
and Scorse (2004a) investigate whether exporters and foreign-owned firms are more or less 
likely to comply with minimum wage legislation than domestic firms using plant-level data from 
the annual survey of manufacturers in Indonesia covering 1990-1999.  During this period, 
Indonesia experienced increases in the legislated minimum wage that differed across regions and 
time.  Harrison and Scorse (2004a) measure compliance with minimum wage laws with an 
indicator for whether the average wages of production workers in a plant are above the legislated 
minimum wage.  Their findings suggest that conditional on worker and plant characteristics, 
foreign-owned firms are associated with higher compliance than domestic firms.  Interestingly, 
while average wages of production workers are less likely to exceed the minimum wage in 
                                                 
19 Note that this argument is conceptually different from the argument that globalization leads to race to the bottom 
in labor standards by forcing competition among governments to offer an attractive business environment.   
  32exporting than domestic plants at the beginning of the sample, exporting plants are more likely to 
comply in the latter part of the sample.  The authors propose that this change is consistent with 
increased activism of human rights groups in Indonesia during the late 1990s. 
In a subsequent paper Harrison and Scorse (2004b) examine the latter point more directly 
by checking whether the wage growth of production workers during this period differs across 
firms in sweatshop industries (i.e., textiles, apparel, and footwear (TFA)) and non-TFA firms.  
TFA firms are a common target of human rights activists and are thus potentially more likely to 
comply with minimum wage regulation than non-TFA firms.  Their results suggest that wages of 
production workers grow faster in foreign-owned and exporting firms in TFA industries than in 
other firms.  When they repeat their analysis for wages of nonproduction workers (for whom 
minimum wage laws are less likely to be binding), no such pattern exists.  It seems thus unlikely 
that the results for production workers simply reflect unobserved firm heterogeneity or 
differential demand shocks across foreign-owned/exporting TFA plants and other plants.   
While the existing evidence is consistent with the claim that foreign-owned plants are not 
associated with lower compliance with minimum wages, several questions remain open for 
future research.  First, an alternative mechanism through which firms might avoid paying 
minimum wages (or comply with other labor market standards) is outsourcing within a host 
country.  Many activists assert that foreign-owned firms circumvent labor market standards by 
outsourcing low-wage activities to small domestic firms that are under lower scrutiny of human-
rights activists.  In fact, Harrison and Scorse (2004b) present some evidence that is consistent 
with this view.  Investigating the importance of this mechanism might be a fruitful research 
agenda for future work.  Second, when labor market standards differ across countries, firms 
might choose to reallocate their activities to markets with lower labor market standards.  Some 
recent evidence is consistent with the footloose image of multinational firms: conditional on firm 
characteristics, foreign-owned plants are associated with greater probability of shutting down 
than domestic plant in the United States (Bernard and Jensen (2003) and in Indonesia (Bernard 
and Sjoholm (2003)).  Moreover, Harrison and Scorse (2004b) find that large TFA exporters 
were more likely to shut down their operations in Indonesia during the intensified anti-sweatshop 
activity.  Disentangling whether differences in labor market standards play a role in these shut-
down decision and whether differences in labor market standards can explain subsequent new 
operations in other markets remains an open question.   
  33In sum, the existing empirical evidence suggests that liberalized trade policy or foreign-
direct investment are not necessarily associated with an increase of the informal sector or lower 
compliance with minimum wages.  Yet, many questions remain open for future research. We 
should emphasize, though, that even if trade liberalization was associated with an increase in the 
informal sector (or greater noncompliance with labor market standards), this would not 
necessarily imply an increase in poverty, if, for example, the individuals who reallocated to the 
informal sector, or were paid wages below the minimum wage, would have otherwise become 
unemployed.   
 
(5) Child Labor 
 
A highly visible component of the debate on the effects of trade reforms on the world’s 
poor is the role of trade policy for child labor in developing countries.  Abolition of child labor is 
one of the four ILO’s core labor standards.  Child labor may not only be associated with lower 
welfare for the working children, it may also lead to intergenerational transmission of poverty if 
it interferes with human capital accumulation.  The opponents of globalization argue that 
increases in product-demand induced by trade liberalization may rise the earnings opportunities 
of children in poor economies, thereby increasing child labor.  Others point out that liberalized 
trade and increased access to world markets could help eradicate child labor by raising the 
standard of living.  Both of these claims are consistent with the predictions of theoretical models 
of child labor.  Trade liberalization could either increase or decrease child labor depending on 
whether greater demand for child labor stemming for trade (i.e., the substitution effect) 
outweighs the reduced supply of child labor in cases where trade liberalization is associated with 
increases in household income and child labor is a bad in parental preferences or households are 
credit constrained (i.e., the income effect).
20
Edmonds and Pavcnik (2004b) study the effect of trade liberalization on the incidence of 
child labor in rural Vietnam using information on child labor from the Vietnamese Living 
Standard Surveys from 1992/93 and 1997/98 that span the period of national and international 
rice market liberalization during the 1990s.  Since theory predicts that product market 
                                                 
20Edmonds and Pavcnik (2004a) provide an overview of the mechanisms and predictions of various theoretical 
models in detail. 
  34liberalization affects domestic labor markets through changes in relative product prices, they 
relate child labor to regional and intertemporal variation in rice prices and address the 
endogeneity of price changes by inclusion of various region-time specific controls that could in 
principle yield spurious correlation between child labor and prices.  The results suggest that on 
average, higher rice prices are associated with lower child labor.  In particular, a 30% increase in 
the real price of rice (as observed in Vietnam during this period) is associated with a 9 
percentage point decline in child labor.  Income effects seem to play an important role in this 
relationship.  Higher rice prices are associated with greater declines in child labor in net-rice 
producing households, while child labor actually increases in household that are large net-
consumers of rice.
21  Interestingly, the magnitude of the income effect is large enough so that 
rice price increases are associated with declines in child labor in agriculture in households that 
are large-net producers of rice.   
Several questions remain open for future research.  In particular, how price changes 
affect child labor depends on country-specific characteristics such as the distribution of resources 
used in the liberalized sectors across households, the sign of the price effect, and the relative 
strength of the income and substitution effects.  For example, in the case of Vietnam, land is very 
equitably distributed across households, so that many households were well positioned to gain as 
net rice producers from higher rice prices and thus benefit via the income effects of rice price 
changes.  The income effects associated with trade reform might not be as pronounced in other 
settings.  Second, regional and intertemporal variation in prices within a country that spans a 
liberalization episode provides an attractive setting to study the implications of trade reforms for 
child labor or other labor market outcomes (as long as one controls for other region-specific time 
varying factors that could lead to spurious correlation between prices and outcomes of interest).  
However, future work on child labor needs to establish a tighter link between exogenous trade 
policy changes and regional price variation within a country.
22   
To conclude, most of the existing evidence on the link between trade policy and 
“poverty” has focused on how trade policy affects household poverty through labor market 
outcomes.  The existing work has not provided a clear message as to whether trade liberalization 
has contributed to phenomena that we typically associate with higher probability of poverty 
                                                 
21Household net-production and consumption is defined based on pre-liberalization information.  
22Similarly, Winters, McCulloch, and McKay (2004) emphasize the importance of understanding how international 
shocks are transmitted to producers and consumers within a country in trade and poverty analysis. 
  35(such as unemployment, informality, unskilled labor wages, child labor, etc.). The connection to 
a poverty increase (or reduction) is naturally even more tenuous. 
 
4.2  Partial Equilibrium Studies: Household Consumption and Production 
 
The analysis of how trade policy affects poverty via the consumption channel has been 
mostly neglected in the empirical work by trade economists.  This is not surprising: trade models 
in general assume identical and homothetic preferences across individuals and countries (Hunter 
and Markusen (1988), Mitra and Trindade (2003) are exceptions).  In this setting, trade-induced 
relative price changes affect all individuals through the consumption channel equally in 
proportional terms and do not alter the distribution of real income in an economy.  While this 
assumption about preferences may be innocuous in models whose main aim is to explain patterns 
of trade and their welfare implications based on supply-side differences across countries, 
relaxing this assumption is critical in studies of the effects of trade policy on poverty.  For 
example, Engel’s law suggests that poor individuals spend a higher share of their budget on food 
items.  Thus, trade-induced price changes likely affect individuals in the bottom and top of 
household expenditure distribution differentially via the consumption channel.   
Similarly, most work on the effect of trade policy on poverty focuses on formal workers 
(often in manufacturing).  While this emphasis might not be too problematic in studies of trade 
reforms on urban sectors in middle income countries, only a small share of individuals 
participate in labor markets as wage earners in poorer economies.  Instead, many of them are 
self-employed on a family farm, family business, or work in non-traded household activities.  
For example, in Vietnam in 1993, only 19 percent of adults ages 20-64 work for wages and only 
7 percent work in manufacturing (Edmonds and Pavcnik (2003)).  In this setting, how trade 
liberalization affects household welfare via production activities depends on a household’s 
exposure to trade-induced price changes as sellers of goods.  Accounting for these effects is 
likely most relevant in rural settings and in studies of agricultural trade liberalizations.   
  Deaton (1989) provides a nonparametric empirical methodology that uses the 
information on the patterns of demand and supply of a commodity to investigate the impact of 
small changes in prices (potentially stemming from trade policy changes) on household welfare 
via household consumption and production along the entire household per capita expenditure 
  36distribution.
23  This analysis requires cross-sectional information on household expenditures and 
household production, often available in Living Standard Measurement Surveys.  Deaton (1989) 
shows that the difference between the household's value of production and the value of 
consumption of a particular good (as a share of household expenditures) is the negative of its 
elasticity of its cost of living with respect to the price of this good.  This is called the 
benefit/expenditure ratio.  Since households in various parts of welfare distribution differ in their 
production and consumption patterns, a convenient way to analyze the distributional 
consequences of changes in prices is by nonparametrically estimating average net benefit ratio at 
all point of per capita expenditure distribution.  This expected benefit ratio shows the 
distributional effect of price changes.  An increase in the price of the commodity will enhance 
(reduce) the welfare of net producing (consuming) households.   
Accounting for the consumption effect and allowing for differences along the household 
expenditure per capita distribution turns out to matter. This is best demonstrated in a recent 
empirical study by Porto (2004a) that employs a general equilibrium framework to address both 
labor market and consumption effects that we discuss in the next section.  Similarly, Deaton 
(1989) and Benjamin and Deaton (1993) study the distributional effects of price changes on 
household welfare via the production channel along the household per capital expenditure 
distribution.  They convincingly show that this analysis can be a powerful tool in identifying 
which households, in which part of the income distribution, may benefit/suffer the most from 
policy induced price changes.  These tools may thus prove useful in studying the welfare 
implications of future agricultural trade reforms. 
 
4.3  A general equilibrium approach 
 
Porto (2004a) develops an ambitious empirical framework to study the impact of trade on 
poverty. This framework incorporates household heterogeneity in a general equilibrium model of 
trade.  Households earn income as skilled and unskilled laborers and derive utility from 
consumption of traded and non-traded goods.  Trade policies affect prices of consumption goods 
and wages, which in turn affect household living standards via consumption and labor income 
                                                 
23The methodology abstracts from substitution effects of price changes in consumption and production.  If the 
substitution elasticities do not differ across households in different parts of per capita expenditure distribution, this 
abstraction is unlikely to affect the distributional consequences of price changes (see Deaton (1989)). 
  37effects.  The model can be used to simulate the effects of trade policy changes on household 
wellbeing along the entire distribution of expenditure per capita across households by extending 
techniques in Deaton (1989) described above.
24   
Porto applies this approach to study the effect of Argentina’s entrance to Mercosur on 
welfare of urban Argentine households.  He finds that Mercosur has pro-poor effects via the 
labor income channel that are consistent with the Stolper-Samuelson mechanism.  Because 
Mercosur-induced tariff cuts were greater in skilled-labor intensive sectors, the structure of the 
model implies that prices of unskilled-labor intensive sectors such as food and beverages 
increase, while prices of skilled-labor intensive good such as household equipment decline.  
Based on the estimates of wage-price elasticities obtained from the household labor surveys, 
these price changes translate into increased wages of unskilled workers and declines in wages of 
skilled workers.  Because households at the bottom of per capita expenditure distribution are 
relatively better endowed with unskilled labor, they benefit via labor income channel, while 
households at the right tail of the household per capita expenditure loose.  The labor-income 
gains to the poor and middle-income households amount to about 7% of their initial household 
expenditure while losses to the rich households can amount to up to 5% of the initial household 
expenditure.  The analysis thus suggests that Mercosur is associated with poverty declines in 
urban Argentina via the labor income channel. 
Regarding the consumption channel, two interesting findings emerge.  First, the 
consumption effects have a pro-rich bias.  This is due to the fact that the model predicts that 
prices of unskilled-labor intensive food and beverages actually increase with Mercosur’s tariff 
reductions and poorer households spend a large share of their budget on this category.  On the 
other hand, the model predicts declines in prices of non-traded goods such as health and 
                                                 
24Porto (2004a) extends the analysis to study distributional effects of trade reforms via labor market income. He 
shows that the effect of a small trade-policy-induced price change on the household labor income is given by the 
product of the wage-price elasticity, the price change, and the share of individual i’s wage earnings in total 
household earnings (summed over all working individuals).  The data and parameter estimates required for the 
analysis are obtained as follows.  First, household budget shares and labor income shares are calculated from 
household expenditure surveys and labor force surveys, respectively.  Second, the trade-induced changes in prices of 
internationally traded goods are calculated based on negotiated changes in product tariffs under the assumption of 
complete pass-through.  Third, time-series information on goods prices is used to estimate the elasticities of skilled 
and unskilled wages with respect to prices of traded goods using typical earnings regressions and exploiting time-
series variation in wages and prices of traded goods.  Trade-induced changes in prices of non-traded-goods are 
estimating by a time-series regression of prices of each non-traded good on prices of all traded goods.  Note that this 
analysis does not require household survey information and price information that spans trade liberalization 
episodes.  Thus, the framework can also be used to study the impact of hypothetical price changes, motivated by a 
policy concern (see Porto (2004b, 2004c) as examples). 
  38education and leisure goods and the budget shares of these goods increase with per capita 
household expenditure.  Thus, abstracting from consumption channel overstates pro-poor bias of 
Mercosur via labor income.  The question then becomes whether consumption effects are large 
enough to offset the labor income effects.  Interestingly, the magnitude of the consumption effect 
is in general much smaller than the magnitude of labor income effects.  The consumption effects 
via traded goods range from declines in a living standard of the very poor by .5% of initial 
household expenditure to increases in living standards of the richest households by .75% of the 
initial household expenditure.  The corresponding numbers for the consumption effects via the 
non-traded goods are .3% to just over 1% of initial household income.  In some cases, these 
effects are almost an order of magnitude smaller than the welfare changes associated with labor 
market income previously discussed.  Porto attributes the relatively small magnitudes of the 
consumption effect relative to the labor income effect to magnification effects of goods prices to 
factor prices within a Hecksher-Ohlin model ala Jones (1965).  In general, the importance of 
consumption channel will likely depend on the nature of trade reform and the consumption 
channel might be more important in liberalizations that focus on agricultural products. 
This approach has several appealing features.  First, it analyzes the effects of trade policy 
in a general equilibrium setting.  This is especially valuable in instances when general 
equilibrium effects on wages and consumption are expected to be large (for example, via 
changes in tariffs in other sectors due to intermediate good linkages or changes in prices of non-
traded goods), or when one is interested in the overall effect of trade reform (rather than its 
impact on wages via a particular channel - the focus of most of the partial equilibrium work).  
Understandably, the general equilibrium analysis comes at a cost of aggregation of sectors of the 
economy.  Second, unlike previous work, the framework considers how trade policy affects 
poverty via the consumption channel. Third, since the framework allows for households in 
different parts of the distribution to differ in the composition of consumption and endowments of 
skilled and unskilled labor, price changes can exert differential effect household welfare along 
the entire distribution of household per capita expenditures.  Fourth, this approach enables a 
study of implications of trade policy on poverty when household level data that spans the trade 
liberalization episode is not available.
25   
                                                 
25The analysis requires cross-sectional data on household expenditures and labor income to obtain labor income 
shares and budget shares, and repeated cross-sectional labor surveys that can be matched to price time-series. 
  39One potential drawback of the method is that its predictions depend heavily on the 
estimates of the elasticity of price of non-traded goods with respect to traded goods prices and 
the wage-price elasticities.  Since these parameter estimates are not identified based on data that 
relate plausibly exogenous trade policy variation to household surveys (and price data) spanning 
the trade reform period, they are unbiased only if the monthly  time-series variation in prices of 
traded goods is exogenous conditional on time trends and year effects.  This is potentially a 
strong assumption.   
Moreover, the predictions of the model may be sensitive to the assumption of complete 
pass-through from trade policy to prices.  Empirically, very little is known on how prices 
respond to tariff changes.  This partially reflects data scarcity—tariff changes are relatively rare 
events and detailed data on industry prices and tariffs surrounding trade liberalization episodes 
are in many cases not readily available.  However, a related literature on how prices respond to 
exchange rate fluctuations (which are much more common) concludes that pass-through is 
incomplete depending on factors such the particular industry and country under consideration, 
etc. (see Goldberg and Knetter (1997)).
26  This suggests that the assumption of complete pass-
through might not be innocuous.  Relaxing this assumption and exploring the sensitivity of the 
results to different pass-through rates may be a useful future extension.
27   
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
Despite many measurement and identification difficulties, and despite conflicting empirical 
evidence on some issues, empirical work on recent trade liberalization episodes has established 
some patterns that seem common across countries and trade liberalization episodes, and may 
hence be informative as to how developing countries adjust to trade reform. These can be 
summarized as follows: 
 
1.  The most heavily protected sectors in many developing countries tend to be sectors that 
employ a high proportion of unskilled workers earning low wages. Accordingly, it should not 
                                                 
26 See Feenstra (1989) on the symmetry between tariff- and exchange rate pass-through. 
27 Porto (2004b), for example, conducts such sensitivity analysis in a different paper and finds that 50% pass-
through leads in general to estimates of welfare changes that can be up to a half the size of the changes obtained 
under the full pass-through assumption.   
  40come as a surprise if trade liberalization has a negative impact on unskilled workers in the 
short- and medium-run. If there is a puzzle, this is why most developing countries find it 
optimal to protect low-skill intensive sectors, when intuitively patterns of comparative 
advantage would suggest otherwise.  Three explanations for this pattern of protection seem a-
priori plausible. The first one would rely on political economy considerations suggested by 
Grossman and Helpman (1994) for example. The second explanation would hinge on an 
extension of Heckscher-Ohlin to a three-factor (natural resources, unskilled, and skilled 
labor) version along the lines suggested by Wood (1999) and Leamer et al (2002)).  Finally, 
this pattern of protection could also be explained by an extension of the Hecksher-Ohlin 
model to at least 3 countries that differ sufficiently in their factor endowments so that they 
partially specialize in various industries (i.e., existence of multiple cones of diversification), 
and one of these countries (e.g., China) is even more unskilled-labor abundant than the other 
developing country (e.g., Colombia) (Davis (1996), Wood (1999)).  Empirical work to date 
has not offered a verdict on the relevance of these alternative hypotheses; this is however a 
fruitful area for future research. 
2.  Despite the large magnitude of tariff and NTB reductions observed in many developing 
countries in the 1980’s and 1990’s empirical work has consistently documented a lack of 
major labor reallocation across sectors. 
3.  There is some evidence that trade liberalization decreased the industry wage premiums in 
those sectors that experienced the largest tariff reductions. This is consistent with the 
dissipation of industry rents, or alternatively, the existence of labor market rigidities that 
constrain labor mobility across sectors in the short and medium run.  However, the effects of 
trade reforms on industry wages are generally estimated to be small. 
4.  In general, the price (wage) response to trade liberalization is more pronounced than the 
quantity response. This is again indicative of market rigidities that may be particularly 
relevant in developing countries in the short run. 
5.  Given the magnitude of the trade reforms, the effects uncovered by empirical work are small, 
and can explain only a small fraction of the general increase in wage inequality. 
6.  Studies using plant- or firm-level data, on the other hand, document substantial output 
reallocation in the aftermath of trade reforms towards more productive firms within an 
industry, so that aggregate productivity increases in the industries that liberalized more. 
  417.  The previous two points taken together suggest that the lack of evidence that trade 
liberalization had any major effects on the wage distribution may be partly due to the high 
level of aggregation used in household surveys (2- or 3-digit ISIC). This aggregation level is 
too coarse to detect worker reallocation across firms within the same industry in response to 
trade liberalization.   
8.  Against this background, empirical studies that use more disaggregate data, focusing on the 
differential effect of trade reforms on firms (possibly belonging to the same 3- or 4-digit ISIC 
sector), or on compositional changes (e.g., quality upgrading) in the products produced by 
developing countries seem particularly promising. What is missing from current empirical 
work is a clear link between such compositional changes and changes in the income 
distribution.  
9.  While establishing a clear link between trade liberalization and absolute poverty poses a 
tremendous challenge, especially in rural areas, documenting the correlation between trade 
liberalization and certain indicators of urban poverty in the short- or medium-run seems more 
promising. 
10. Existing empirical studies find little support for “race to the bottom” arguments.  If anything, 
there is some evidence that more “openness” increases the level of, and compliance with 
minimum wages, and reduces child labor. 
11. Similarly, there is little evidence that trade reforms are associated with an increase in 
informal employment and a worsening of working conditions. To the extent that one finds 
such evidence, it seems to be relevant in settings characterized by severe labor market 
rigidities.  A study of labor market institutions and their interactions with trade policy is 
therefore essential for understanding the effects of trade liberalization on inequality and 
poverty. 
12. Trade liberalization changes relative prices and is thus likely to affect poverty via the effect 
of price changes on consumption. Empirical work using simulations suggests that these 
effects are potentially significant. Yet, work in this area is still at a preliminary stage. Part of 
the difficulty arises from the fact that little is known about the empirical relationship between 
trade policy changes and changes in relative prices. 
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